Multilateralism is a fundamental part of the liberal international order, as theorised by scholars like Robert Keohane and G. John Ikenberry, who emphasise its importance in reducing transaction costs, producing global public goods, and stabilising expectations among state actors. From this perspective, the notion of a unilateral reorganisation of multilateral processes, even by hegemonic powers such as the United States, appears problematic both theoretically and empirically.
The current phase of transition in the international order is marked by a tension between disruptive forces — driven by the logic of competitive unilateralism and great power rivalry — and efforts towards cooperative rearticulation. As neo-institutionalist literature suggests, international institutions tend to display significant resilience even amidst systemic shocks, owing to their capacity for gradual adaptation and the enduring interests of key actors.
In this context, there is a renewed activation of multilateral dynamics within the Euro-Atlantic space and in relations between Europe and China. The rapprochement between these regions can be understood through the theory of ‘institutional balancing’, which suggests that state actors use multilateral platforms to mitigate power asymmetries and prevent unilateral actions perceived as destabilising. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has further strengthened this trend, serving as a catalyst for functional convergence among diverse actors and revitalising the role of the United Nations as a key forum for legitimacy and coordination.
Conversely, highly personalised or ad hoc coalition-based negotiating approaches — often associated with political leaders favouring unilateral actions — are limited in their ability to generate stable and inclusive outcomes. Such formats tend, in fact, to lessen the predictability of international interactions, increasing the likelihood of defection and systemic instability.
Simultaneously, the latest literature on global governance emphasises the increasing influence of non-state actors and informal diplomatic practices. Multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the States General promoted by the E-novation Foundation, can be viewed as forms of ‘networked governance’, where knowledge production, the sharing of risk perceptions, and consensus-building occur through horizontal interactions between public and private actors. These processes help to bolster the resilience of the international system, complementing — rather than replacing — formal institutional channels.
From this perspective, the involvement of transnational financial actors is also gaining increasing analytical importance. The participation of groups such as the Anchorage Group illustrates a broader shift in global governance, characterised by a growing hybridisation between the public and private sectors. As emphasised by Anne-Marie Slaughter, such networked arrangements help to redefine how coordination, legitimacy, and the capacity to address systemic challenges are generated.
In summary, far from being outdated, multilateralism today seems to be undergoing a process of adaptive recalibration. Unilateral pressures might weaken certain temporary aspects of it, but they do not undermine its core function within the international order. On the contrary, current developments indicate its reorganisation into more flexible, hybrid, and multi-actor forms, aligning with the increasing complexity of the global system.