The Yemen Front and the Growing Threat to European Security
Reporting date: 25 July 2026
Prepared by Roberto Pucciano, Anchorage Group – Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Overall risk assessment: Critical
Executive Summary
The Iran conflict has entered a more dangerous and geographically dispersed phase.
The immediate strategic development is the opening of a renewed military front in Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition has carried out strikes on Houthi-controlled military sites in response to attacks on Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea.
The confirmed targets reportedly included a naval facility near Hodeidah and positions on Kamaran Island. Houthi media also alleged that telecommunications infrastructure had been struck.
The Saudi-led coalition described the operation as a response to facilities being used to threaten commercial navigation and to attack Saudi vessels.
The Houthis subsequently claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Jizan in southern Saudi Arabia and warned that further retaliation would follow.
This exchange risks reviving the direct Saudi-Houthi confrontation that Riyadh had spent several years trying to contain through negotiations.
The wider strategic significance is considerable. The conflict is no longer centred solely on Iran, US forces and the Strait of Hormuz. It now threatens to link two critical maritime theatres:
- the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the Gulf’s oil and gas normally flows;
- the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to the Suez Canal.
The simultaneous disruption of both corridors would place extraordinary pressure on global energy markets, maritime insurance, European supply chains, and the political cohesion of the transatlantic alliance.
- The Opening of the Yemen Front
The Saudi-led strikes mark a significant shift from primarily defensive interception to direct offensive action against Houthi capabilities inside Yemen. The operation followed the Houthis’ declaration of a maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia and reports of attacks on Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea. The Houthis have stated that they intend to deny Saudi shipping access through the Bab al-Mandeb in response to Saudi military activity and the wider US-Iran war.
In Saudi Arabia, the Houthi campaign poses both a military and an economic challenge.
Riyadh uses its East-West Pipeline to transport oil from the Gulf coast to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, thereby reducing its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. A credible Houthi threat to Red Sea exports would therefore undermine one of Saudi Arabia’s principal strategic alternatives to the Gulf route. The Saudi decision to strike suggests that Riyadh has concluded that interception and maritime protection alone are insufficient.
Nevertheless, it also leaves the kingdom exposed to renewed missile and drone attacks on its southern cities, airports, oil installations and desalination infrastructure.
Although the operation has been described as Saudi-led, there is currently insufficient public evidence to conclude that all Gulf Cooperation Council states participated directly. The broader Gulf states are politically aligned in opposing threats to shipping, but their operational roles, if any, should be assessed separately.
- Houthi Strategy and Iranian Regional Leverage
The Houthis’ actions align with a broader strategy of applying distributed pressure across the region.
Iran does not need to achieve conventional military superiority over the United States or the Gulf states to exact high economic and political costs. Instead, it can exploit aligned movements, maritime geography, missiles, drones and uncertainty over command relationships.
The Houthi campaign serves several strategic purposes:
- it opens a second maritime theatre beyond the Strait of Hormuz;
- it threatens Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil-export corridor;
- it forces regional and Western military resources to be split;
- it raises shipping and insurance costs without requiring full control of the Red Sea;
- it increases pressure on European and Asian governments to seek an end to the conflict.
The Houthis may have less military capacity than Iran, but they operate near one of the world’s most vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Even a limited number of credible attacks could be enough to deter commercial operators. The Houthis have claimed attacks on two Saudi tankers, and Saudi Arabia has confirmed at least one attack on Saudi-linked shipping. The full extent of the damage and the precise operational coordination between Tehran and Houthi commanders remain unclear.
- The Bab al-Mandeb as a Second Strategic Front
The Bab al-Mandeb is about 29 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and marks the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Ships travelling between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal must normally pass through it. The consequences of sustained disruption would extend well beyond Saudi Arabia.
Before the recent regional crises, the passage carried a large share of container traffic, energy shipments and trade between Europe, Asia and the Gulf. The Houthi declaration has already contributed to a further decline in shipping movements. Ship-tracking data cited in recent reporting indicated that Bab al-Mandeb crossings had fallen to 29 on 21 July, compared with 44 two days earlier and approximately 65 to 72 daily passages before the earlier Red Sea crisis.
A complete physical blockade is not necessary to produce major economic effects.
The perception that ships may be attacked is enough to cause:
- shipping companies to suspend passages;
- insurers to increase war-risk premiums;
- crews to refuse assignments;
- vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope;
- ports and logistics providers to revise delivery schedules.
The route around southern Africa can add substantial distance, fuel consumption and transit time to voyages between Europe and Asia.
- The Strait of Hormuz and the Dual-Chokepoint Crisis
The escalation in Yemen must be considered alongside the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
US military operations remain focused on reducing Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, while Washington continues to enforce restrictions on Iranian ports. The US military has reported firing on merchant vessels allegedly attempting to breach the blockade. Iran, meanwhile, continues to use the strait as its principal means of exerting pressure on the United States and Gulf oil exporters. Recent vessel data suggest that traffic through Hormuz has fallen dramatically. Only nine crossings were reportedly recorded on 21 July, compared with much higher normal levels. The simultaneous disruption at Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb creates a qualitatively different crisis. Hormuz threatens energy exports leaving the Gulf. Bab al-Mandeb threatens energy and commercial cargo moving between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and Europe.
Together, they exert pressure on both the origin and transit points of Middle Eastern trade.
- Current US-Iran Military Situation
The broader US-Iran confrontation remains unresolved. US strikes have continued against Iranian military, naval, missile and surveillance capabilities, while Iran and allied forces have attacked US-linked facilities across the region.
Iranian or Iran-aligned drones and missiles have reportedly targeted or approached facilities in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan. Regional air-defence systems have intercepted several of these threats.
At the same time, diplomatic contacts have not entirely ceased.
On 24 July, President Donald Trump said that discussions with Iran were ongoing and suggested that Tehran was approaching the negotiations more seriously. However, no confirmed breakthrough or renewed ceasefire has emerged.
This presents a contradictory strategic picture: negotiations remain open, yet the military theatre continues to expand.
- Economic and Energy Consequences
The combined pressure on Hormuz, the Red Sea and other energy routes is contributing to a broader supply shock.
Oil prices have traded at elevated levels, although reports vary by benchmark and trading period. Recent assessments place crude prices above approximately US$96 per barrel, with some trading periods exceeding US$100. Refined products may face even greater pressure, as transport disruption occurs alongside constraints on global refining and export capacity.
The principal economic consequences include:
- higher crude oil and refined-fuel prices;
- increased maritime insurance premiums;
- longer shipping routes and delivery times;
- pressure on European manufacturing supply chains;
- higher aviation and road-transport costs;
- renewed inflationary pressure;
- declining consumer confidence;
- reduced economic growth in energy-importing countries.
Insurance premiums for vessels operating near both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb have risen sharply. Even where passages remain technically open, insurance conditions and crew-safety considerations may render commercial voyages impractical.
- Humanitarian Risks in Yemen
The renewed Saudi-Houthi confrontation also has serious humanitarian implications.
Yemen remains structurally vulnerable after years of war, economic fragmentation and damage to public infrastructure.
Hodeidah is particularly sensitive given its role in commercial imports and humanitarian access.
Houthi-affiliated media reported that the Saudi strikes wounded at least two people and damaged telecommunications infrastructure. These claims have not been independently verified.
Further attacks around Hodeidah could disrupt:
- imports of food and medicine;
- fuel distribution;
- telecommunications;
- humanitarian operations;
- civilian employment;
- access to coastal communities.
The risk is that a military campaign intended to protect shipping could unintentionally deepen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and fail to eliminate the dispersed missile and drone capabilities used by Houthi forces.
- Strategic Implications for Europe
8.1 Energy Security
Europe is directly exposed to simultaneous instability at Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.
Although European states have reduced some forms of energy dependence in recent years, they remain vulnerable to global oil-price movements and to disruptions affecting liquefied natural gas, refined fuels and petrochemical feedstocks. A sustained closure of the Hormuz strait would restrict Gulf energy exports. A sustained threat at Bab al-Mandeb would complicate the movement of energy and commercial cargo towards the Mediterranean and European ports.
European governments may therefore need to consider:
- coordinated releases from strategic petroleum reserves;
- temporary energy-demand measures;
- alternative LNG and crude-oil sourcing;
- support for vulnerable industries;
- contingency plans for fuel-price increases;
- closer coordination with Norway, the United States and North African suppliers.
8.2 Suez Canal and European Trade
The Red Sea-Suez route is central to European trade with Asia. If vessels are forced to go around the Cape of Good Hope, European companies face longer transit times, higher freight costs and less predictable inventories.
The effects would not be confined to energy. They would affect:
- automotive components;
- electronics;
- machinery;
- pharmaceuticals;
- clothing and consumer goods;
- chemicals and fertilisers;
- food products requiring reliable delivery schedules.
The impact would be particularly significant for European industries reliant on just-in-time supply chains.
8.3 Inflation and Monetary Policy
Higher fuel, freight and insurance costs could reintroduce inflationary pressure at a time when European central banks may be attempting to normalise monetary policy. The direct price of oil is only one component. The more serious risk is that higher transport and production costs spread throughout the economy. A prolonged crisis could therefore complicate interest-rate decisions, forcing policymakers to balance weaker growth against renewed inflation.
8.4 European Naval Commitments
The dual chokepoint crisis will increase pressure on European governments to expand maritime security operations.
European navies may be asked to:
- protect commercial vessels;
- participate in escort missions;
- contribute air-defence or surveillance assets;
- improve intelligence-sharing;
- support mine-countermeasure operations;
- reinforce existing EU and allied missions in the Red Sea.
However, European naval capacity is limited, and simultaneous commitments in the Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea approaches and the Indo-Pacific already strain available ships and personnel.
The crisis may therefore expose the gap between Europe’s economic dependence on open sea lanes and its limited capacity to secure them independently.
8.5 NATO and Transatlantic Cohesion
The conflict could create political divisions within NATO.
Some European governments may favour stronger military support for US operations, while others may resist being directly associated with a widening war against Iran and its regional partners.
The principal alliance-related questions will include:
- whether attacks on US facilities require broader allied support;
- whether European ships should participate in offensive or defensive missions;
- how NATO should respond to Iranian or Houthi threats to European interests;
- whether operations should be conducted through NATO, the EU or ad hoc coalitions.
Disagreement over these questions could undermine alliance cohesion, even if all members agree on the importance of maritime security.
8.6 Migration and Humanitarian Pressure
A renewed large-scale war in Yemen could cause further displacement within the country and towards the Horn of Africa.
If the wider conflict worsens economic conditions in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon or the Gulf, Europe could also face longer-term migration consequences.
The immediate scale is uncertain, but European governments should not treat the humanitarian dimension as separate from the security crisis.
Food-price increases, infrastructure collapse and job losses can convert military escalation into population movements.
8.7 European Strategic Autonomy
The crisis will reignite debate about European strategic autonomy.
Europe depends on Gulf energy, Asian trade, American naval power and maritime routes beyond its direct control. Yet it lacks a unified mechanism to respond to a simultaneous security and economic emergency across those routes.
A credible European response would require more than naval deployments. It would entail:
- common strategic reserves;
- coordinated energy purchasing;
- resilient supply chains;
- investment in ports and alternative transport routes;
- greater naval readiness;
- stronger diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE and Iran.
The dual-chokepoint crisis therefore exposes not only an immediate security problem but also a structural weakness in Europe’s geopolitical model.
- Risk Assessment
Most Likely Scenario
The most likely near-term outcome is a continued limited escalation.
Saudi Arabia is likely to conduct further strikes if Houthi attacks on shipping persist. The Houthis are likely to retaliate against southern Saudi Arabia and continue threatening Red Sea navigation. The United States and Iran will probably continue military pressure while preserving indirect diplomatic contacts.
Most Dangerous Scenario
The most dangerous scenario would involve simultaneous escalation on four fronts:
- sustained closure or near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz;
- successful Houthi attacks on major Saudi oil infrastructure or tankers;
- renewed large-scale Saudi air operations across Yemen;
- direct attacks causing substantial US or Gulf-state casualties.
Such a development could transform the conflict into a full-scale regional war and trigger a severe global energy and shipping shock.
De-escalatory Scenario
A limited de-escalation remains possible if mediators secure the following:
- protected navigation through Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb;
- a suspension of Houthi attacks on Saudi shipping;
- a pause in Saudi strikes inside Yemen;
- limitations on US and Iranian military operations;
- a renewed diplomatic framework addressing sanctions, maritime security and regional forces.
However, the proliferation of actors makes any settlement more difficult. Even if Washington and Tehran reach an understanding, Saudi-Houthi tensions may persist independently.
- Indicators to Monitor
Priority indicators for the coming days should include:
- further Saudi-led strikes in Yemen;
- direct participation by other GCC states;
- additional Houthi missile or drone attacks on Saudi territory;
- attacks on Saudi tankers or the Yanbu export route;
- vessel traffic through Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz;
- changes in war-risk insurance premiums;
- European or NATO naval deployments;
- diplomatic activity by Oman, Qatar, Pakistan or the United Nations;
- attacks against Hodeidah port or civilian infrastructure;
- signs of renewed ground operations by anti-Houthi forces within Yemen.
Conclusion
The opening of the Yemen front marks a decisive escalation of the Iran conflict.
The Saudi-led strikes were intended to protect commercial navigation and to deter Houthi attacks. They may, however, reignite a confrontation that neither Saudi Arabia nor Yemen has fully resolved.
The greater strategic danger lies in the link between the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea and Iran’s pressure at the Strait of Hormuz. For the first time in the current conflict, the security of both principal maritime routes linking Gulf energy and Asian trade to Europe is under simultaneous threat.
For Europe, this is not a distant regional confrontation. It is an immediate test of energy resilience, commercial security, naval capacity and political cohesion.
The central challenge for European policymakers will be to protect navigation without being drawn into an open-ended regional war.
That will require a combination of maritime deterrence, diplomatic engagement, energy contingency planning, and a more serious approach to European strategic autonomy.